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The stability of the EMS depends crucially on realignment expectations of the market
participants. In this paper we discuss how to measure such expectations and how to relate them
to economic fundamentals, central bank reputation, and institutional arrangements of the EMS.
We find the following empirical regularities for FF/DM and IL/DM exchange rates: (1) expected
devaluations are positively related to the current exchange rate deviation from the central parity;
(2) expected devaluations are negatively related to the length of time since last realignment in
the short and medium run; (3) the Basle-Nyborg agreements seem to have a stabilizing effect for
both currencies examined, albeit through different channels; (4) large revaluation expectations
occur immediately after devaluations. (1) and (4) are not inconsistent with the hypothesis of
over-speculation or market inefficiency.
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United Kingdom1 Introduction
One of the central questions in the theory of international monetary regimes is whether
fixed but adjustable exchange rates are a contradiction in terms. In other words, can
a system of adjustable parities survive? Is it, in some sense, stable? This question has
dominated the policy debate on the European Monetary Systyem (EMS), especially
since the liberalization of international capital movements in the second half of the
1980's. It also characterized the debate on exchange-rate based stabilizations, started
by Diaz Alejandro (1981), Dornbusch (1982) and Calvo (1983).
Recent research in international finance, in particular the work of Flood and Car-
ber (1984) and the empirical research in the vein of Lizondo (1983), has clearly and
convincingly established the linkage between the collapse of a fixed exchange rate
and expectations held by actors in financial markets. In addition, the analysis of the
stabilizing properties of monetary policy rules—Simons (1936), Friedman (1968) and
Barro and Gordon (1983)—has shown that the crucial channel through which such
rules can stabilize inflation and economic activity is the behaviour of the private sec-
tor's expectations. Hence the "strength" or "weakness" of an adjustable rate system
is directly related to the behaviour of expectations under such a regime.
This paper is an exploration of the determinants of expectations of the French
franc/Deutsche mark and Lira/Deustche mark parity changes during the EMS period.
Such an exploration should be, in our view, the first step of a broader analysis of the
stability properties of a fixed-but-adjustable rate system. More precisely, the question
that we ask in this paper is: What determines the expectations of parity changes? Are
the institutional arrangements of the EMS—designed to stabilize the foreign exchange
market, such as the target zone and intergovernmental coordinations—effective at
all? In order to answer these questions we need to obtain reliable estimates of such
expectations, and then attempt to relate them to economic and institutional variables.
The next section deals with the empirical measurement of realignment expecta-
tions, section 3 discusses bow to select the fundamental and institution variables,
section 4 discusses the estimation methodology, section 5 reports the results, section
6 contains some concluding remarks.
12 Measuring Expected Parity Changes
The first step in studying the empirical behaviour of market expectations is to find
an empirical measurement of such unobservable expectations. The measurement of
expected parity changes has to take into account two problems. The first is the mea-
surement of expected changes in exchange-rates. In this study, we assume interest-
rate parity. That is, interest-rate differentials reflect expectations of exchange rate
changes and that risk premia, or other sources of differences between ex-ante returns
in different currencim, are insignificant. Svensson (1990) argues that in a managed
exchange rate regime with target zones, given realistic distributional assumptions
about fundamentals, the exchange-rate risk premium should be insignificant.
The second problem in measuring parity changes is the presence of exchange-rate
bands, or target zones. Since exchange rates are flexible within these target zones, in
order to estimate the expected change in a central parity it is necessary to separate
the expected changes within the band and the expected shift of the central parity.
In this, we extend the work of Collins (1984, 1986), who first studied realignment
expectations in the EMS using interest-rate differentials.
To fix ideas, decompose the log exchange rate S into the log central parity c and
the log percentage deviation from the central parity x:
(1)
It follows that the one-period expected change (devaluation) of the exchange rate can
be decomposed into the expected central parity shift and the expected change in the
percentage deviation from the central parity:
E[AsdItJ =E[AcjIIj]+ E[AxJI]. (2)
All expectations are conditional upon information available at time t, denoted by
I. Under interest rate parity, the left hand side can be replaced by the interest rate
differential between the home country and the foreign country. Denote the differential
of interest of deposits of maturity jbySi, the expected devaluation can be written
as:
— = — E[(xj — x)II}. (3)
2With 8' observed in the interest rate data, the task of measuring expected deval-
uation is reduced to measuring expected changes in x. Notice that the expectation is
a full inform ation expectation in the sense that the information set I should contain
information concerning the possibility of both a realignment and no realignment in
the next jperiods,in other words, the observations on x should reflect the mar-
kets assessment of future realignment possibilities.1 It is thus essential to make sure
that the sample on x contain enough realignment observations. When the data are
available, we can obtain the ex post measure of expected realignment devaluation as
—C=— (xt+j—xi). (4)
Wecan obtain an ex ante measure of realignment expectations by projecting the
above on the current information set, as will be defined below.
3 Choosing the Variables in the Information Set
To determine what information variables to be included in the projection equation,
it would be ideal to have a theoretical model that links the fundamental variables to
expected realignment in equilibrium. It is well known, however, that the available
theoretical models do not tell us what constitute the "fundamentals," so they are
suggestive at best. A familiar brand of models, based on the Barro-Gordon (1983)
framework of monetary policy games, describe the central bank's main objective as
price stability, which can be achieved through exchange rate targeting as in the EMS.
However, the central bank also has other objectives, and when those objectives are in
crises, the central bank may deviate from the exchange rate targeting policy. This no-
tion of "crises mentality" is consistent with evidence found in the Bernanke-Mishkin
(1992) case study of central bank behaviour in major industrialized countries. Gio-
vannini (1990) contains a model of this kind, known as an "escape-clause model."
'Svensson (1991) develops an alternative measure of expected devaluation associated with re-
alignment expectations: d —E[(x, — xi)no realignment]. The key feature of this measure is that
the second term is a cendilienal expectation, conditional on an information set that is generally
smaller than the full set I,, with the realignment events excluded from the latter. While desirable
in the case of few realignment observations, the conditional expectation of x can not, in general,
be correctly estimated from the data even with realignment observations excluded from the sam-
ple, since the possibility of a future realignment should be "priced" by the market under rational
expectations, and the sample x is conditional on both realignment and no-realignment possibilities.
3Instead of resorting to a particular model, we rely on the projection-equation ap-
proach. The following observations serve as background to our choice of variables in
the information set.
Assume that q is the probability of a large adverse shock to the economy occurring
in the next period, and that the shock is so big that it warrants a realignment attempt
(the escape clause). The government may choose to devalue, or to defend the parity.
Suppose the public assigns a subjective probability p to the event that the government
will devalue in face of the shock, then the expected devaluation Ec is a probability
weighted average defined as follows:
EAc= (1 —p) x O+p[qâ+ (1 —q) x 0], (5)
where &'isthe expected size of devaluation if the central bank is pursuing a dis-
cretionary (devaluation) policy. Its value can be determined in tbe equilibrium. In
general, it is positively related to the adverse shock and the weakness of the economy
and the exchange rate mechanism —thestronger the economy and the better the
intergovernmental coordination in defending the parity, the easier it is for the gov-
ernment to weather the negative shocks, and therefore the smaller the expected size
of realignment. Simplifying, the above definition can be written as
EAc =pqg3CA (6)
It can been clearly seen that expected realignment depends on p, q and â6di.The
empirical task now is to find proxies that capture the essence of these three variables.
To measure p, the public's subjective probability that the central bank will devalue
the currency under crises, we need to specify a rule on how this probability is formed.
One hypothesis, as suggested by the experience of many EMS countries, is that the
longer the central bank manages to keep the exchange rate parity free of realignment,
the smaller is p, since the public may gain more confidence on the central bank based
on its past record of success. A simple way to capture this idea is to use the length of
time since last realignment (we actually use ln(1+t)) as a proxy for this behaviour of p.
The hypothesis suggests that we should expect to find a negative correlation between
p and this measure of time. An alternative hypothesis is the so called "honeymoon"
effect commonly seen in the post-election popularity of a winning political party:
4the popularity surges after the election, and gradually dies out, exhibiting a hump-
shaped pattern.2 In the case of the public's perception of the central bank after a
realignment, one can imagine a similar scenario: p may first decline as the public
begins to be convinced that the new parity is properly in line with fundamentals so
it may last into the future. But as time gets longer, uncertainty about the central
bank's resolve may increase for various reasons. This hypothesis implies that p can be
viewed as a U-shaped function of time. A third hypothesis, as suggested by Ghisellini
(1992), assumes that there is a fixed cost of realignment, so realignment is infrequent,
but the longer the time since last realignment, the more likely a new realignment will
occur. This implies a positive relationship between p and time. Combining the above
discussions, we use two separate formation rules for p, one is a direct measure of time
since last realignment (t1n + t)), the other is a quadratic measure (at + bt*2)
aimed at capturing the U-curve effect (negative a and positive b).
The probability of a large adverse shock to the domestic economy relative to the
foreign counterpart, q, can be measured in terms of various fundamental variables,
such as trade balance, industrial production, etc. While the expected size of devalu-
ation, at5,canalso be linked to the above variables, as well as to such fundamental
positions as foreign exchange reserve, budget deficit, wages and inflation, and nom-
inal variables such as liquidity. It should be noted that p may also depend on the
government's financial positions such as deficit and foreign exchange reserves. Put
together, we can actually isolate the independent effect of time since last realignment
after controlling for these fundamentals.
We also incorporate some important institutional features of the EMS and eval-
uate their effectiveness in reducing realignment expectations. One such institutional
arrangement is the fluctuation band, or the target zone. The target zone literature
has shown on both theoretical and empirical grounds that the band has a stabilizing,
or mean reverting effect on expected exchange-rate deviation from the central par-
ity. In other words, the expected change in exchange rate deviation from the central
parity is negatively correlated with the current deviation from the central parity. Al-
though the models deal specifically with the deviations from central parity, the mean
2We thank Charles Goodhart for suggesting this idea.
5reverting result has been commonly interpreted in a naive way, which leads to the con-
clusion that the band has a stabilizing effect on realignment expectations. Changes
in deviation from central parity and changes in central parity itself are equivalent
only in the case of no realignment. So in general, when realignment is allowed, the
stabilization property, at least in the form of negative correlation, may not apply. We
include a variable representing the deviation from the central parity in our empirical
estimation and examine whether the negative correlation holds for expected parity
changes. This is crucial in evaluating the stability of the EMS.
Another feature of the EMS is the institutionalized coordination among member
countries. The coordination efforts are aimed at strengthening member countries'
position in preventing and counteracting crises and speculations. We focus on the
effectiveness of one such coordination—the introduction of the Basle-Nyborg agree-
ments. Finally, the credibility and stability of the EMS can also be explored by
studying the reaction of the foreign exchange market to the event of a realignment.
This is done employing a "realignment dummy."
The following is a complete list and definitions of the information variables.
• Cl, C2, ...:Constantdummies corresponding to each central parity regime.
10 regim for IL and 7 for FF.
• Xl: Log relative foreign exchange reserve position measured in terms of the
DM.
• X2: The percent change in budget surplus on a cash basis (Italy or France
minus Germany).
• X3 The difference of the trade balance surpluses (Italy or France minus Ger-
many).
• X4 Relative industrial production indices. Denote foreign (German) variable
with a star, the definition can be written as
(IP \ ln (7)
• X5 The position of the exchange rate within the band (x).
6• X6 Form 1: The log of one plus the number of months since last realignment,
denoted as t; Form 2: ot + bt*2.
• X7 An index of relative CPI's. Denote S the exchange rate measured in terms
of domestic currency value of one unit of DM, the index is written as
I CPI ' lnpj*). (8)




• X10: DM/TJSS exchauge rate.
• Xii: Jump dummy that takes the value 1 at the first month of realignment
and zero otherwise.
• X12: Xl multiplied by the slope dummy that equals 0 before the Basle-Nyborg
agreements and 1 afterward.
• Xi3: X5 multiplied by the same slope dummy as in X12.
The sources for the data used are listed at the end of the paper. The frequency
of our data is monthly, and the horizons we study are 1 month and 3 months. We
look at the lira/DM and French franc/DM exchange rates since the beginning of the
EMS.
4 Estimation
In the previous sections we have argued that the estimation of the expected change in
the central parity requires an estimation of the expected change in the exchange rate
within the band. Our task is to explore the determinants of expectations of parity
changes. To do this, we estimate the following equation:
—(xt.H
—Xj) = z;p + (11)
7where Zisa vector of variables in agents' information set at time t. Here we assume
Zconsistsof all the information variables listed in the previous subsection. The
disturbance term uj has two components. One is the expectations error (xt+ —
Ex2+), theother is an error due to the imprecise measurement of expectations, or
the existence of variables affecting expectations that are left out from the vector
Z.Theformer is, under the assumption of rational expectations, orthogonal to any
variable included in Z,dependingon the severity of specification errors. In general,
the expectation error always swamps the error due to mismeasurement, because, as it
is well known, the variance of the unpredictable component of exchange rates is very
high. When j> 1the expectation error follows a moving average process of order
i-i.
Equation (11) allows us to estimate, simultaneously, the expected change in the
exchange rate within the band and the determinants of expected parity changes.
Consider the linear projection:
— — xt)]=Z'j3, (12)
where jisa consistent estimate of fi.Equation(12) shows that the projection of the
interest-rate differential net of the realized exchange-rate changes within the band on
information provides an estimate of the expected change in the central parity. The
coefficient vector j3 will indicate the relation of the expected change in the central
parity to fundamentals.
The basic strategy of this regression is inspired by the following observation. Under
the assumption of linear rational expectations, the best estimate of the expectations
of any economic variable is its projection on variables in agents' information set at the
time such expectation is formed, the property of this estimate is that the estimated
residuals, which represent the "surprises," are orthogonal to the variables used to
form expectations. In that sense, information cannot be used more efficiently to form
expectations, and therefore expectations are rational.
A problem with unrestricted projection using target zone data is that it fails to
explicitly specify the restrictions implied by the presence of the target zone band,
which is a part of the public's information set, and is nonlinearly related to, and
8correlated with many other information variables. This may result in incorrect esti-
mates of expectations. This problem is discussed by Chen and Giovannini (1992b),
who propose a type of Box-Cox transformation which recovers the good properties of
projection equations. This transformation cannot be used in the equation we estimate
in this paper, because it would not allow the easy joint estimation of expectations
of realignments and exchange-rate movements within the band. However, we have
verified that, in the case of the EMS, the errors that arise from not exploiting the
information on exchange-rate bands are likely to be negligible (see also Svensson,
1991).
5 Results
Tables 1 (plus 1A and 1B) and 2 (plus 2A and 2B) report the estimates of the
projection equation over the 1-month horizon, respectively for the lira and the French
franc. Tables 1 and 2 contain the estimates over the full sample (March 1979 to
January 1992), tables 1A and 2A contain the estimates over the period from March
1979 to August 1987, while tables lB and 2B contain estimates over the period from
September 1987 to January 1992. The breakpoint is the date of the Basle-Nyborg
agreement (September 12, 1987), of the Committee of Central Bank Governors, which
strengthened the Exchange Rate Mechanism of the EMS by adopting a number of
measures, including in particular an extension of the use of the Very Short Run
Financial Facility to finance intra-marginal interventions.
In the case of Italy, the variables whose coefficients tend to be consistently signifi-
cant are X5 (the position of the exchange rate within the band), and X6 (time since
last realignment—a variable meant to capture learning and reputation effects). The
coefficient of X5 is always positive, indicating that a wider deviation from a central
parity increases expectations of exchange-rate changes. Interestingly, it is not signif-
icant at the 5% level in the period since the Basle-Nyborg agreements (table 1B).
The strong significance and the negative sign on the coefficient of X6 implies that
a proven tough exchange-rate stance—represented by the lack of recourse to realign-
ment for a long period—other things equal, seems to improve the credibility of the
exchange rate regime. The jump dummy xli has a large negative coefficient, and is
9some times significant. This suggests that the occurrence of a realignment induces
sharp revisions of realignment expectations. The fact that Xl1isnot significant after
Basle-Nyborg (table 1B) is not surprising: the realignment of the lira of January 1990
was only due to the narrowing of the fluctuation hand of that currency vis-a-vis the
ERM partners.
The results for the case of France are broadly similar to Italy's, with X5, X6 being
the most significant variables, i.e., the position of exchange rate within the band and
the time elapsed since last realignment are the most powerful source of revision of
expectations. The jump dummy Xli also exhibits negative significance in table 2.
Tables 3 and 4 report regression results for 1-month projections over the whole
sample for Italy and France, with slope dummies on Xi and X5 to capture the effects
of Basle-Nyborg on the sensitivity of realignment expectations with respect to reserves
and exchange rate position within the band. Tables 3A and 4A contain regression
results for the 3-month horizon. The slope dummies X12 and X13 are obtained by
multiplying Xl and X5, respectively, by a series that equals zero up to August 1987,
and one thereafter.
For Italy, the slope dummy on the position of exchange rate within the band,
X13, is negative and significant for both one month horizon (5.4% p—value) and
three month horizon (2.8% p—value), while the slope dummy X12 is not significant.
The opposite holds for France: the slope dummy on the foreign exchange reserve
position, X12, is positive and significant for both one month horizon (5.6% p—value)
and three month horizon (0.27% p—value), while the slope dummy X13 is not signif-
icant. Overall, this evidence suggests that Basle-Nyborg agreement may have indeed
strengthened the central bank's ability to defend the announced parity. However, such
gains in credibility appear to have been achieved through different channels in the two
countries: for Italy, exchange rate deviation from the central parity less worrisome
to the public (negative coefficient on X13) since the Basle-Nyborg, probably because
of the perceived availability of the Very Short Run Facility that may strengthen the
central bank's ability to intervene and regulate the exchange rate within the band;
For France, the gains in credibility primarily come from the strengthened exchange
reserve positions.
10The 3-month projections (tables 3A and 4A) contain some more interesting results.
For the case of Italy, X4 (the relative industrial production) becomes significant,
with a negative sign indicating a decline in realignment probabilities when the Italian
industrial production improves relative to that of Germany. For the case of France, X1
and X9 become significant at 5% level, with negative signs suggesting that stronger
relative reserve positions and relative liquidity help reduce realignment expectations.
To visualize the projected devaluations arising from the equations we estimated,
we plot the predicted values of the regressions, together with the dates of the actual
EMS realignments (each indicated by the tip of a triangle). Figures 1 and 3 plot the
predicted 1-month devaluation (expressed in percent per annum) for the Lira/DM
and the FF/DM respectively (the predictions are based on equations whose estimates
are in tables 3 and 4). Interpreting the figures in terms of the model in section 2,
we observe that they imply unambiguously a positive p (perceived probability that
the government follows an escape clause policy, and does not credibly peg the cur-
rency) throughout most of the sample. The figures also show that the market tends
to anticipate a realignment in the 1-month horizon at all times, but such anticipation
becomes more pronounced (indicated by large spik in the figures) in the few months
prior to actual realignments. The figures also highlight the importance of the infor-
mation about the occurrence of the realignment: after the realignment the expected
devaluation of the lira and of the franc turn sharply negative.
For comparison, figures 1A and 3A report the observed 1-month interest rate
differentials. While there are visible spikes they do not appear to match the timing
of realignments with good precision. Another noteworthy feature of figures 1A and
3A is the familiar evidence of interest rate convergence for both countries (relative
to Germany) over time. We cannot, however, find corresponding drastic decline of
realignment expectations in figures 1 and 3, although the variability of the expected
devaluation has decreased over time. In other words, interest rate convergence is not
necessarily a full reflection of a decline in expected devaluation.
In order to get a clearer indication of the accuracy of the estimated predictions
about the timing of realignments, we plot in figures 2 and 4 the difference between
the 1-month and the 3-month expected devaluations (the term premia). Simple in-
tuition tells us that a positive term premium implies the estimated probability of a
11realignment is higher in the next month than in the two months at the long end of
the horizon. Figures 2 and 4 show that the term premium tends to rise sharply one
month prior to realignments, implying that the timing of realignments is correctly
anticipated.
In contrast, figures 2A and 4A show the 1-month vs. 3-month term premia di-
rectly calculated from the term difference of the interest rate differentials. They do
not appear to anticipate the timing of realignments with any good precision. This ev-
idence further demonstrates that the interest rate differential is not a precise measure
of realignment expectations.
Finally, our fitted data in figures 1, 2, 3 and 4 reveal large reverse of realignment
expectations in the month immediately following realignments. Again, such negative
expected realignments are absent in the figures constructed directly from interest rate
differentials (figures 1A, 2A, 3A and 4A).
In the above report, X6 takes the form t. When it is replaced by the alternative
form at + b12, we find some evidence of the so called "honeymoon" effect, or the
U-curve effect. As we can see from table 5, the estimated coefficient aisconsistently
negative for both the lira and the French franc in both the one-month and three-month
projection horizons. This also holds for with an opposite sign. The coefficients
in the one-month regressions are all significant at the 5% level, but they become
less significant in the three month regressions. The results indicate that lack of
realignment initially helps dampen realignment expectations (negative slope of the
U-curve when t is small), but as time goes on, this trend tends to be reversed
(upward-sloping part of the U-curve). To assess which part of the effects matters
more in practice, we calculate the number of months it takes to reverse the downward
trend using the one-month regression results.3 We find the turning point occurs
roughly 22 months after a realignment for the case of the lira and about 42 months
for the case of the franc. Time periods of such lengths are long enough for practical
considerations. So we view the dampening effect of a clean realignment record on
the market expectations as the dominating effect, which is consistent with the result
obtained by using the proxy t alone.
3This is simply done by setting the derivatives of at + bt2(withrespect to t) to zero and solve
for t.
126 Concluding Remarks
In this paper we have presented a methodology to explore the relationship between
expectations of parity changes and economic variables. This methodology accounts
for the expectation of exchange-rate changes within fluctuation bands, and therefore
should in principle yield more precise estimates of expected parity changes.
Interest rate differentials are commonly used as a proxy for realignment expec-
tations. As Svensson (1991) pointed out, the flexibility of exchange rates within
the target zones, however, makes such a proxy imprecise. This is confirmed in our
study with a more carefully constructed realignment expectation measurement. In
addition, our estimated expectations reveal some facts about realignment expecta-
tions that are not apparent in the interest rate differential proxy, such as less than
dramatic reduction in expected devaluation as implied by interest rate convergence,
and more precision in expected timing of realignment than implied by interest rate
differential and its term premium.
The most important finding is that expected parity changes vary over time, and
appear to be significantly related to a number of variables. The variables that have
consistently high explanatory power are the length of time since last realignment
(measuring the reputation of the central bank) and the deviation of exchange rates
from the central parity. The results indicate that in general the absence of realign-
ments improves the central bank's reputation. Such an effect is strong in the short
and medium run, but in the long run, the trend may be reversed. This is consistent
with the "honeymoon" hypothesis and the presence of a fixed cost of realignments.
We have also found that a change in regime is detectable after the Basle-Nyborg
agreements.
In order to evaluate the performance of adjustable parity systems like the EMS it
is tempting to assess whether the expectations of parity changes which we estimate
in this paper appear, according to given criteria, to be rational. Some of our observa-
tions in the previous section were indeed motivated by that question. The two most
important results of our regressions are the positive significance of the variable X5,
representing the percent deviation of the exchange rate from the centre of the band,
and the large turnaround of expected parity changes following realignments. The
13first finding is opposite to the naive generalization of the "stabilization effect" of the
fluctuation band, a hallmark of recent target zone literature. Our evidence could be
consistent with herd-like behaviour in the foreign exchange markets, which however is
not necessarily inconsistent with rational expectations under imperfect information.
The second finding, that the estimates of expected parity changes after realign-
ments are always negative—the DM is to be devalued relative to the lira and the
franc—and large, together with the size and significance of the dummy variable rep-
resenting the recent occurrence of a realignment in some cases, is difficult to interpret.
There are two potential explanations for this puzzle. One is that market participants
take larger-than-necessary short positions, and find the market is over-sold after re-
alignment. This could happen when speculators trying to bring down the parity
overestimate the government's ability to defend the system.
An alternative explanation is that speculators abandon the market after having
profited from the change in parity. This would be the case, for example, of fund
managers who are given performance targets and do not have much of an incentive
to active trading after those targets are met. As a result, information may not be
efficiently used in the marketplace, with the resulting puzzling discrepancies between
actual observations and predictions of models that assume rational expectations, such
as ours. In general, the data at our disposal do not seem to provide evidence in
support of the theory that adjustable parity systems are "stable". Indeed, two of
the most significant empirical facts we have uncovered—discussed heretofore-are
not inconsistent with the hypothesis that the fluctuation band generate insufficient
stabilization on private realignment expectations, and that over-speculation or market
inefficiency are present.
These suggestions, however, should not be taken as conclusive evidence in favour
of market inefficiency. Such test requires a structural model. While our evidence
cannot be considered conclusive, it adds to other empirical regularities that charac-
terize adjustable parity systems, the most prominent of which is perhaps the so-called
"capital-inflow problem" (see, for a discussion on the EMS, Giovannini, 1992). Our
results, together with the empirical regularities studied in the literature on the capital-
inflow problem, point to potential inherent instabilities of adjustable parity systems.
14Data Sources
Exchange Rates: Financial Times. End of month observations.
Interest Rates: Financial Times. Eurodeposit rates. End of month observations.
Interest Rates:
Xl:
• Germany: Bundesbank external position. Monthly Report, Table 12. Measured
in Millions of DM.
• France: Ban que de France Quarterly Bulletin, Table 10, Counterparties de M3.
Measured in billions of FF.
• Italy: Banca d'Italia net external position, Economic Bulletin. Measured in
Billions of IL.
Budget Surplus/Deficit:
• Italy: Treasury borrowing requirement. Bank of Italy.
• Germany: Federal fiance on a cash basis. Data Resources, Inc.
• France: Public authority financial deficit (national accounts). INSEE Comptes
et Indicateurs Economiques.
Trade Balances: OECD.
Industrial Production: OECD. Index 1985=100.
Consumer Prices: OECD. Index 1985=100.
Wages:
• Italy —Contractwages. International Financial Statistics.
• Germany —Monthlywage and salary rate in the overall economy. Datastream
Internaltional, Inc.
• France: Labor costs. International Financial Statistics.
X9:
• Germany and Italy —Liquidityof deposit banks, line 20, IFS.
• France —Ml,IFS.
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17TABLE 1
One-Month IL/DM Expected Devaluation:
Full-Sample Regression
(March 1979 —January1992)




























































































One-Month IL/DM Expected Devaluation:
Sub-Sample Regression
(March 1979August 1987)




















































































One-Month IL/DM Expected Devaluation:
Sub-Sample Regression
(September 1987 —January1992)




























































One-Month FF/DM Expected Devaluation:
Full-Sample Regression
(March 1979 —January1992)
















































































One-Month FF/DM Expected Devaluation:
Sub-Sample Regression
(March 1979 —August1987)
















































































One-Month FF/DM Expected Devaluation:
Sub-Sample Regression
(September 1987 —January1992)
















































Final Regression Results With Regime Dummies:
Expected One-Month IL/DM Devaluation
(March 1979 —January1992)
Variable Coefficient t-Value p-Value
C 1 -688.0799 -0.9628 0.3374
C 2 -690.6784 -0.9710 0.3333
C 3 -676.1609 -0.9540 0.3418
C 4 -684.9434 -0.9650 0.3363
C 5 -662.2425 -0.9396 0.3492
C 6 -655.5832 -0.9334 0.3523
C 7 -671.8954 -0.9596 0.3390
C 8 -660.1667 -0.9479 0.3449
C 9 -669.7942 -0.9650 0.3363
C 10 -673.9213 -0.9738 0.3319
X 1 2.4665 0.1594 0.8736
X 2 -0.1933 -0.5125 0.6091
X 3 298.6601 0.6427 0.5215
X 4 -0.9510 -0.0169 0.9866
X 5 0.6774 5.8305 0.0000
X 6 -8.4593 -4.0102 0.0001
X 7 -124.9686 -0.7844 0.4342
X 8 43.1606 0.3646 0.7160
X 9 -26.0058 -1.5849 0.1154
X 10 7.6254 0.2416 0.8095
X 11 -11.1960 -1.4228 0.1572
X 12 9.2878 0.7399 0.4607
X 13 -0.4418 -1.9414 0.0543
Diagnostics






Final Regression Results With Regime Dummies:
Expected Three-Month IL/DM Devaluation
(March 1979 —January1992)






































































































Final Regression Results With Regime Dummies:
Expected One-Month FF/DM Devaluation
(March 1979 —January1992)
Variable Coefficient t-Value p-Value
C 1 368.5814 3.5424 0.0005
C 2 370.0584 3.7313 0.0003
C 3 369.2664 3.7354 0.0003
C 4 377.8181 3.6990 0.0003
C 5 376.2023 3.6429 0.0004
C 6 374.1967 3.5823 0.0005
C 7 370.5824 3.6129 0.0004
X 1 -18.2409 -2.9416 0.0038
X 2 -0.2471 -1.1117 0.2682
X 3 -84.2307 -0.4062 0.6852
X 4 46.1439 0.6252 0.5329
X 5 0.9458 7.6955 0,0000
X 6 -7.5872 -3.3990 0.0009
X 7 267.8869 1.9424 0.0542
X 8 26.3587 0.2533 0.8004
X 9 -19.6365 -0.9974 0.3204
X 10 -18.3181 -0.9569 0.3403
X 11 -12.1930 -1.2015 0.2317
X 12 14.5593 1.9234 0.0565
X 13 -0.2006 -0.6343 0.5269
Diagnostics






Final Regression Results With Regime Dummies:
Expected Three-Month FF/DM Devaluation
(March 1979 —January1992)




























































































Estimated coefficients aandbin the full projection equation with X6 at + 5t2
Regression a b































One-Month Expected Devaluation: ILIDM
TimeFigure la
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IL-DM Term Premium of Interest Rates






























FF-DMInterest Rate Differential (1 Mo)
Time (Year and Month)
1Figure 4
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FF-DM Term Premium of Interest Rates
Time (Year and Month)
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